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SOCIETÀ ITALIANA PER LO STUDIO DELLA STORIA CONTEMPORANEA
sede operativa c/o Dip. di Scienze dello Stato - Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II
via Mezzocannone, 4 - 80134 Napoli
sede legale c/o Dip. di Storia - Università degli Studi di Siena, via Roma, 56 - 53100 Siena
e-mail presidenza@sissco.it segreteria@sissco.it
internet http://www.sissco.it

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corrispondenza e libri inviare a «Il mestiere di storico», c/o Daniela Luigia Caglioti, Dipartimento
di Scienze dello Stato, via Mezzocannone 4 – 80134 Napoli
e-mail mestieredistorico@yahoo.it
copertina Franco Molon TheSign
amministrazione Viella s.r.l., Via delle Alpi, 32 - 00198 Roma
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DISCUSSIONI

Demografia e politica: una storia transnazionale

Matthew J. Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The struggle to control world population*, Cambridge (MA), Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, XIV-521 pp., \$ 35,00

ne discutono

Mark P. Bradley, Giovanni Gozzini, Erez Manela,
Emily S. Rosenberg e Matthew J. Connelly

Mark P. Bradley

Matthew Connelly's *Fatal Misconception: The struggle to control world population* is a seminal book, perhaps the most important work in the field to appear over the last decade. Since the end of the Cold War, if not before, there has been much talk about the need to write a different kind of international history of the twentieth century, one in which the United States and the former Soviet Union, and (Western) states more generally, were not necessarily the central actors and the Cold War itself the primary analytical optic. This transnational turn envisioned histories that accorded significantly more attention to non-state actors, whether they be the United Nations or non-governmental organizations, as well as actors in the global South, and to global issues that by their very nature crossed national boundaries, from the economy, science and technology to the environment, human rights and decolonization. More was imagined here than simply telling auxiliary stories to a Cold War master narrative. Rather, as such hortatory works as Akira Iriye's *Global Community* have argued,¹ the Cold War analytical lens obscured as much as it revealed and alternative transnational forces may in fact have been the driving force of international relations in the post-1945 period. In short, this new capacious framework promised to transform how we understand the last century.

1. A. Iriye, *Global Community*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002.

But even among historians most interested in the potentialities of these new conceptual directions (among which I include myself), monographs that convincingly root the emergence and complexities of the transnational turn in a sustained analysis of archival and other primary source material have been surprisingly slow to appear. As Connelly rightly suggests in another context, it can be hard to find a seat in the reading rooms of any number of national archives but those for the archives of the UN and most non-state actors are usually empty. Moreover in the work that has emerged, there can be a tendency to too quickly valorize the thought and practice of non-state actors and to see transnational space as unfolding in progressively more emancipatory directions toward an almost Kantian perpetual peace.

In its examination of the world population control movement, *Fatal Misconception* is among the very first works that casts a wide archival net to more critically interrogate the emergence, operation and impact of the politics of the transnational. Along with oral history interviews, Connelly employs an impressive range of archives from throughout the world to ground his arguments. State archives, notably those of India, Great Britain, France and the United States, form a portion of his research but the bulk of his analytical claims rest on prodigious research in archives of nongovernmental organizations (including the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, Planned Parenthood and the Vatican), UN affiliated organizations and some thirty-nine collections of private papers of individuals who play critical roles in his story.

Few readers of *Fatal Misconception* are likely to come away with an overly sanguine view of Connelly's actors or the population control movement more generally. He is, relentlessly, critical of them for their hubris in believing that they can and should intrude into the decisions of women and men about such intimate decisions as the size and nature of their families. In doing so, he articulates a broader critique of this kind of international advocacy. Unlike domestic social movements in which there is some kind of local accountability, he suggests, the transnational can be a profoundly anti-democratic space shaped by high modernist, racist, neocolonial and authoritarian sensibilities that seek to impose a set of values and norms on often unwilling and usually poor and less powerful local publics. Perhaps the only other historian who gets so deeply at the problematics of these transnational campaigns, and the complicity of non-governmental organizations in them, is Bradley Simpson in his ongoing project on human rights politics in the 1970s in which the guardians, state and non-state alike, of what was and wasn't within the «proper» scope of global rights norms cast a blind eye to the genocide in East Timor.²

Among the many achievements of Connelly's book are his efforts to put a human and organizational face on the transnational, which can emerge in many works as an

2. See, for instance, B. Simpson, «Unwarranted and Mischievous Interference»: *The Carter Administration, Human Rights, and the Indonesian Occupation of East Timor*, in «International History Review», forthcoming.

inchoate or shadowy presence. His narrative helps us see how individuals from Margaret Sanger, David Rockefeller and Indira Gandhi to organizations such as Planned Parenthood, the Population Council and the Vatican played critical if often deeply troubling roles in the population control movement. At the same time, Connelly lays bare the bureaucratic politics that drove UN agencies and those of the American, Indian and Chinese states to impose draconian technocratic policies to regulate population size. He also usefully historicizes the emergence of his non-state actors, situating his account of them across the sweep of the twentieth century and in a sensibility that combined alarm over numbers with a eugenics-inflected concern about «quality» of population.

Writing history on such a wide global canvass necessarily involves narrative and analytical choices. Because Connelly's book will likely serve as a model of how a new kind of international history can be written, it is useful to explore the kinds of interpretative vistas he has chosen *not* to explore to better appreciate the continuing opportunities and challenges of writing this kind of history. Connelly is especially concerned with the role of individuals in shaping the global population control movement, and draws a deft series of portraits of better, and lesser, known figures who were integral to it. While there are considerable narrative and analytical strengths to such an approach to the transnational sphere, there is also the danger that a recovery of and concentration on the individual can downplay the larger structural forces that mutually constituted their beliefs and actions. As Joan Scott argued in a classic essay some years ago, the project of making experiences visible that were once omitted or overlooked in conventional histories can preclude the critical examination of the inner workings, meanings, operations and power of ideological systems in which those experiences were embedded.³

In his efforts to make critical dimensions of the transnational visible in *Fatal Misconception*, the relational construction between individual agency and political, economic, social and cultural structures sometimes becomes blurred. This is so in several parts of Connelly's narrative, including his two case studies of Indian and Chinese population control campaigns in which figures like Sanjay Gandhi or Jian Song seem to carry an outsized interpretative significance. It is especially the case in his discussion of Nafis Sadik, a UN official who emerges for Connelly as a symbol of what he sees as a more humane and just approach to population that emphasizes reproductive rights and health and the improvement of educational opportunities for women. But these approaches to population, no matter how attractive they may be (especially by contrast to the high-handed coercion of the population control movement), necessarily have their own genealogies too, which largely go unexplored here. The «emancipation of women, not population control» has

3. J.W. Scott, *Experience*, in *Feminists Theorize the Political*, ed. by J. Butler and J.W. Scott, New York, Routledge, 1992, pp. 22-38.

ultimately «remade humanity» (p. 375), Connelly argues, but he never is able to fully tell us how and why.

In his focus on the individual Connelly is also concerned with individuals of a particular type, generally transnational or state elites. And while this choice too pays significant analytical dividends, it is not the only way one might approach the population control movement or the history of the transnational more broadly. As the anthropologist Anna Tsing has recently argued, the stories we tell about the transnational require attention to when the global and the local meet in messy and unpredictable encounters that she terms moments of «friction».⁴ In his exploration of the population control campaigns in India and China, Connelly concentrates on top-down rather than bottom up perspectives. For the Indian case in particular, where he employs a variety of state archives, he draws a damning portrait of these failed campaigns and their coercive violence. The agency of the individuals who are its subjects, however, remains just out of view, as they do in his discussion of the Chinese case as well. Connelly makes a bow toward «grassroots resistance» and its impact on softening state policies but that dimension of his story is far from central to his project.

I am not suggesting that Connelly should have written a different book. But readers who are looking to his work as a model for writing a new international history ought to be aware of the analytical potentialities of alternative approaches. The contestations, ironies and contradictions of the relationships between global, national and local processes (along with an appreciation of the internal complexities of the local itself) that animated population control efforts and other transnational encounters may require moving beyond the archive to engagement with historical ethnography.⁵ The responses of local actors to the Chinese state's population control campaign in the 1980s and 1990s are potentially revealing ones for moving toward a more nuanced and complex understanding of the relationship between the transnational and the local. For example, in one southern Chinese village (the subject of what is widely considered to be the China field's best longitudinal village level study), the powerful local party secretary in the 1980s had four children despite the state's two-child policy in rural areas and its insistence that village cadres serve as a model for these state policies. As the women's representative on the village's party committee, whose main responsibility was enforcing state birth control policy, commented: «There's a fine of 1,200 yuan for having a third child, but people consider that as nothing. The pregnant women just run away into hiding with relatives in other villages. When they come back with the newborn they just pay the fine and that's that».

4. A. Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004.

5. For a splendid example of this kind of approach in another context, see H. Kwon, *The Ghosts of War in Vietnam*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

More than twenty years later, in 2006, an employee in the village government's family planning department was herself the mother of four children, the result of a preference she and her husband shared for a son. After three daughters, the fourth child was a boy; when she was pregnant with him she left the village and went into hiding elsewhere to avoid pressure for an abortion but other than paying a financial penalty (almost double what it had been in the 1980s) after the birth she and her family have suffered no consequences for their decision.⁶

Local Chinese perspectives and actions were not always a matter of resistance. For many urban parents, and gradually those in the countryside too, accommodation to state norms began to change the culture of family formation as much because of deepening neo-liberal economic reforms and the spread of consumer culture as coercive state norms. At the same time, state population policy itself reflected an engagement with a variety of transnational ideational forces, from Marxist-Leninist social science to the Club of Rome «limits to growth» perspectives common in the West in the 1970s. If Connelly notes some of these developments in passing, his approach leaves unexplored a more densely textured analysis of how a variety of local actors – state and non-state alike – made sense of population control policies and negotiated their own complicity in and resistance to them in a situation where the increasing presence of global capitalist modernities shaped and constrained individual and familial choice.⁷

Finally Connelly is not especially keen to engage with critical theory. In a recent symposium in the «American Historical Review» on the practice of global history, Connelly noted his skepticism about theory, especially what he terms its cultural forms.⁸ Beyond a cursory mention of Foucault's biopolitics in the conclusion of *Fatal Misconception* (and how could he resist really given his subject), Connelly stays true to his word. But I find it curious in a work so fundamentally and passionately concerned with the violence done to women and men's bodies under the international population control regime that perspectives from gender theory and studies so little inform his analysis. For many working on population control in a variety of cultural contexts, the gendered dimensions of state and

6. A. Chan, R. Madsen, J. Unger, *Chen Village: Revolution to Globalization*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2009, pp. 318, 369. Tyrene White offers a suggestive analysis of these local strategies of resistance in her *China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 1949-2005*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006, ch. 6.

7. On accommodation, see S. Greenhalgh, E.A. Winckler, *Governing China's Population*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005, ch. 7. For a revealing discussion of state policy formation that offers international historians useful methodological tools for approaching micropolitics in a wider global context, see S. Greenhalgh, *Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng's China*, Berkeley, California University Press, 2008.

8. *AHR Conversation: On Transnational History*, in «American Historical Review», 111 (2006), pp. 1440-1461.

individual thought and action are foundational whether it be the ways in which women and the family become contested icons of state and societal modernist projects or how family planning in the wider context of global capital expansion prompts new formations of sexuality, fertility, the body and the self. The global or the transnational is sometimes more gestured to than fully engaged in these mainly nation-based or local studies, allowing considerable opportunities for international historians to productively engage and deepen these rich lines of inquiry.⁹ But more generally there are ways of looking at the world pioneered by feminist scholars that hold the potential to significantly enlarge how we conceive of the very grounds of writing international history. Judith Butler's concerns with the performative as a means to both uncover and transgress the structures of power that inform conceptions of gender, for instance, may offer transformative conceptual tools for moving beyond state-centered accounts of the international.¹⁰

Whether or not Connelly ultimately takes us there is not so much the issue. In providing a compelling model for the writing of international history, and in stimulating how we might also begin to think about constructing alternatives it, *Fatal Misconception* is a magnificent achievement.

Giovanni Gozzini

Questo di Connelly è un libro paradossale, il cui punto di forza è anche il punto di debolezza. L'ampio e impressionante valore aggiunto è infatti rappresentato dalla scrupolosa ricostruzione dell'azione di uomini, donne e organizzazioni che nel corso del '900 si sono impegnate sul fronte della International Planned Parenthood (come si intitola la federazione costituita nel 1952). Al centro di questo movimento stanno figure come Margaret Sanger, fondatrice nel 1916 della prima clinica per il controllo delle nascite a Brooklyn, ma anche fondazioni private statunitensi come la Ford e la Rockefeller (dai loro

9. See, for example, H. Paxson, *Making Modern Mothers: Ethics and Family Planning in Urban Greece*, Berkeley, California University Press, 2004; K. Asdar Ali, *Planning the Family in Egypt*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2002; N. Chatterjee, N.E. Riley, *Planning an Indian Modernity: The Gendered Politics of Fertility Control*, in «Signs», 3 (2001), pp. 811-845; and A. Ong, *State Versus Islam: Malay Families, Women's Bodies and the Body Politic in Malaysia*, in *Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia*, ed. by Aihwa Ong and M.G. Peletz, Berkeley, California University Press, 1995, pp. 160-194.

10. See J. Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, New York, Routledge, 1999, pp. 173-189; and my *The Ambiguities of Sovereignty: The United States and the Global Human Rights Cases of the 1940s and 1950s*, in *The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws, Populations*, ed. by D. Howland and L. White, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2009, pp. 124-147.

archivi proviene buona parte della documentazione raccolta) capaci di influenzare la politica di istituzioni come il Population Department delle Nazioni Unite e la Banca Mondiale. Per quanto Connelly rifiuti espressamente l'idea di una «global conspiracy» (p. 14) questo insieme di idee e pratiche viene analizzato sulla base di un nesso organico interno definito dalla categoria di «population control»: «the fatal misconception was to think that one could know other people's interest better than they know themselves» (p. 378). Mi pare con ogni evidenza un'accezione troppo vasta – cos'è la politica, se non lo sforzo di convincere altri del proprio interesse? – e tale da includere anche, ad esempio, l'obbligo scolastico. Infatti porta Connelly a comprendervi (e talvolta confondervi) eugenetica, controllo delle nascite, pianificazione familiare. Sulla scorta di Foucault (p. 379) ogni politica demografica viene assimilata a una violazione dei diritti individuali e familiari in campo riproduttivo. Un esempio per tutti. Un volantino diffuso negli anni cinquanta nel Sud-est asiatico che recita «to improve the quality plan the quantity – the happy family is a planned family» viene così commentato: «continued to reflect the influence of eugenics» (p. 164). Quando mi sembra invece senso comune la profonda differenza tra tentare di selezionare caratteri ereditari per eliminare quelli considerati negativi e tentare di controllare il numero di figli. Una cosa è pensare di avere tre figli e un'altra pensare di averli tutti maschi o tutti biondi. Connelly non ignora questa differenza e la richiama nelle pagine iniziali e finali della sua ricerca: uno dei suoi meriti maggiori è mettere in luce quanto la confusione tra eugenetica e pianificazione fosse presente nella Sanger e in una parte minoritaria ma significativa dei movimenti descritti nel libro. Ma la sua lettura di una realtà sfaccettata e soprattutto in continuo divenire lo porta ad attribuire a quella realtà una compattezza e una forza che non credo abbiano mai avuto. «This is a story of how some people have tried to control others without having to answer to anyone» (p. XI); «a new kind of global governance» (p. 7); «population control as a movement» (p. 9); «it is made up of networks – networks of ideas, of individuals, and of institutions – which were organized to control humankind» (p. 13); «transnational population control movement» (p. 61); «transnational network» (p. 379); «the division of labor was both geographical and functional [...] population control had achieved this conspicuous position and in some places started to become a mass movement» (p. 277).

Questa interpretazione organicista lascia in ombra un passaggio che mi sembra meritevole di maggior considerazione: l'approvazione di leggi eugenetiche fondate sulla sterilizzazione obbligatorie da parte di parlamenti democratici nella prima parte del '900 (Svezia, California, Danimarca, Norvegia, Finlandia). Piuttosto che successi di una lobby internazionale giacobina, mi sembrano l'effetto di un passaggio culturale decisivo per tutta la prima parte del secolo e radice comune alle ideologie che l'hanno dominata: il connubio tra la fede positivista nella scienza e l'inedita potenza assicurata allo stato dalla tecnologia. È una *fatal misconception*, senz'altro. Ma un po' più larga e meno legata all'azione soggettiva di gruppi, come è quella immaginata da Connelly. Credo che la

ricerca si sarebbe giovata molto di un approccio meno centrato sull'*agency* umana e più attento all'evoluzione socioculturale, come mi sembra quello di Eager nel suo studio *Global Population Policy*.¹¹ In fondo il cammino degli ideologi del controllo demografico verso il riconoscimento della libera scelta (femminile) appartiene a quello più generale, non facile e non scontato, verso una democrazia rispettosa dei diritti umani.

Oltretutto la storia delle agenzie descritte nel libro è una storia di sconfitte. Non si può attribuire loro la caduta della fecondità giapponese nel secondo dopoguerra (p. 243) perché i tassi sono bassi e vicini a quelli europei già nel 1950 (2,7 contro 2,5). Quella cinese avviene del tutto al di fuori della loro influenza (p. 180). Il caso indiano si rivela un disastro e fa perdere per la prima volta le elezioni al Partito del Congresso di Indira Gandhi. Come ammettono gli stessi «agitatori» rievocati nel libro, in ogni paese investito dalla loro propaganda il numero di figli per donna era già declinante (p. 338) e i risultati concreti della loro azione non distinguono quei paesi dagli altri (come dimostra la tabella a p. 374). Connelly lo riconosce di sfuggita (p. 373) ma c'è un fattore causale determinante – molto più di qualsiasi lobby – nel calo della fecondità ed è il calo della mortalità infantile: quando questo si verifica (come nell'Europa dell'800) non c'è più bisogno di fare figli a raffica per farne sopravvivere almeno qualcuno e la gravidanza smette di essere un fatto ripetitivo, tale da occupare tutta la parte di vita feconda delle donne. C'è un nome importante – Gary Becker – che Connelly non menziona, ma al quale è legata la tesi di un legame tra calo della fecondità, aumento del reddito e preferenza per qualità (anziché quantità) di figli: il «capitale umano» da essi rappresentato diventa funzione del denaro e del tempo che gli si può dedicare. È questa la ragione di una convergenza abbastanza naturale nel tempo (senza differenze tra paesi ricchi e poveri) verso la media di due figli, che guarda caso è anche il punto stabilizzazione della popolazione e quindi di equilibrio con le risorse disponibili. Se l'Africa subsahariana è oggi l'unica parte del mondo ancora esclusa da questa transizione (la media è di 5 figli) è perché la mortalità infantile è ancora troppo alta (90 per mille contro 60 del resto dei paesi poveri e 10 dei paesi ricchi).

C'è un punto che però, da solo, vale tutto il libro e riabilita completamente la fatica di Connelly: «why did they remain silent or defensive about efforts to force IUDs, abortion, and sterilization on Chinese women?» (pp. 358-9). Ha perfettamente ragione. Tra la nostra indifferenza in India e Cina le politiche di pianificazione familiare hanno spesso oltrepassato il confine dei diritti umani e sottoposto a violenza o ricatto economico milioni di persone: 8 milioni di sterilizzazioni in India nel 1976-1977, altri 4 milioni di donne sterilizzate nel 1983-1984 (Connelly ci aggiunge quelle dotate di spirale, ma su questo invece non lo seguì), 7 milioni in Cina nel 1979 (pp. 323, 348, 342). Le conclusioni di Connelly sulla libera scelta della donna come condizione vincolante per

11. W.W. Eager, *Global Population Policy: From Population Control to Reproductive Rights*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004.

ogni politica demografica (p. 375) vanno ricordate e sottolineate. Esiste ormai un ampio *corpus* di studi che dimostra in tutti i paesi l'esistenza di un nesso di proporzione diretta tra scolarità femminile, calo della mortalità infantile e calo della fecondità: senza forzare o convincere nessuno (semmai informare). Un recente libro di Helene Epstein illustra come l'Uganda sia l'unico paese ad aver dimezzato i tassi di infezione Hiv/Aids, grazie alla semplice sensibilizzazione porta a porta.¹² La «mano visibile» delle donne e delle istituzioni distingue e rende molto più rapida la transizione demografica odierna dei paesi poveri (da alta mortalità e natalità verso il calo di entrambe) rispetto a quella avvenuta nel corso dell'800. Non starei nemmeno a dire, come fa lui (p. 383) che la vita potenziale del nascituro sia un bene pubblico. Contro la piaga dell'infanticidio che ancora alligna in quei paesi – anche se Connelly la sovrastima (p. 357): la sovrarappresentazione maschile in Cina è pari all'8 per cento non al 17 per cento, il problema è che è sempre la stessa dal 1950 mentre in Europa i maschi sono il 95 per cento delle femmine – non esiste miglior rimedio che consegnare il potere alle donne. Alle donne come persone: non alle famiglie. Una delle pagine migliori del libro è il resoconto (p. 364) dell'incontro tra Giovanni Paolo II e Nafis Sadik, ginecologa pakistana e direttrice del Fondo delle Nazioni Unite per la Popolazione, avvenuto nel 1994 in Vaticano: quando il Papa riceve una lezione – lo dico da cattolico praticante – di umanesimo e concretezza. Mi sembra importante ricordare che già nel 1930 la Chiesa anglicana ammetteva il ricorso a metodi anticoncezionali artificiali purché esente da «selfishness, luxury, or mere convenience». E la stessa cosa affermavano i 70 componenti della commissione di studio nominata da Giovanni XXIII: anche contro il loro parere Paolo VI promulgò l'*Humanae Vitae*. Sfido chiunque a trovare nel Nuovo Testamento insegnamenti centrati sull'istituto familiare: al centro ci sono sempre gli individui e con le famiglie Cristo non ha mai un rapporto facile.

Su un punto invece non sono proprio d'accordo con Connelly. «This book argues against the notion that our problems are caused by excess people» (p. 491). Non molti sanno che i paesi dell'Africa subsahariana hanno dal 1950 tassi di crescita del Pil che non hanno niente da invidiare a Europa e Nord America: sono quelli del Pil pro capite a rimanere molto più indietro. Ma soprattutto bisogna che Connelly ci spieghi (in un altro libro, perché in questo non lo fa) come può la Terra sopportare nel 2050 tra i 9 e gli 11 miliardi di abitanti (secondo le diverse proiezioni dell'Onu) avendone ospitati per decine di migliaia di anni soltanto una piccola frazione (molto meno inquinante e invasiva). Altrimenti continuerò a credere (per fortuna in larga compagnia) che questo sia comunque un problema. E anche dannatamente urgente. Da risolvere magari con auto pulite e non con sterilizzazioni forzate. Ma su questo credo che siamo d'accordo.

12. H. Epstein, *The Invisible Cure. Africa, the West and the Fight against AIDS*, New York, Farrar, 2006.

Erez Manela

For some time now, scholars in the United States and elsewhere have been groping for a new way to write international history. Inspired by the globalizing world in which they live, they have been asking they could best write its history. Manifestos in that vein have proliferated, calling on scholars to «internationalize» international history, to adopt new interpretive lenses, account for new actors, integrate new topics and themes, and forge new spatial and temporal frameworks that could take international history beyond the traditional focus — still important but wholly insufficient — on war, diplomacy, and foreign policy; in short, on the thoughts and actions and official elites. All this has been part of an even broader movement in the historical profession that has sought to de-center the nation-state and transcend its boundaries as the primary edifice of history, a movement that is now recognized as the «transnational turn» in the profession.

In recent years, there have been increasing signs that this «new international history», which has long lay just beyond the horizon, has begun to emerge. International organizations and NGOs, long almost entirely ignored by international historians as irrelevant or, even worse, soporific, have finally begun to receive some historiographical attention. Increasing attention is being paid to the roles of non-Western actors and arenas in international society. The application of innovative interpretive lenses, such as race and gender, is moving from the furthest margins toward the center of the practice of international history. As more and more historians self-consciously transnationalize their work, international historians are increasingly adopting new frames and exploring long-neglected regions, themes, and actors. A fresh narrative of the history of international society is beginning to take shape.

Within this grand project, Matthew Connelly's new book is a landmark achievement that opens broad new avenues of scholarship and debate. Connelly's first book, published in 2002, already positioned him as an innovator in the field, affording a fresh perspective on the history of the Algerian War and of postwar decolonization more broadly in the context of the changing norms and dynamics of international society.¹³ Connelly has since produced several seminal articles, most notably a call to «take off the Cold War lens» in writing postwar international history and an injunction for international historians to «see beyond the state» as they rethink the history of modern international society.¹⁴ With *Fatal Misconception*, Connelly has once again transformed our view of the nature and

13. M. Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: The Algerian Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002.

14. M. Connelly, *Taking Off the Cold War Lens*, in «American Historical Review», 105 (2000), pp. 739-769, and Id., *Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty*, in «Past & Present», 193 (2006), pp. 197-233.

scope of international history and the range of possibility within which it can be conceived. The book, which traces the history of the movement to control world population, is exhaustively and imaginatively researched, vividly narrated, and provocatively argued. It opens new possibilities for writing the history of international society and will no doubt become a model and an inspiration for future work in the field.

This brief review, however, will not dwell on the book's many strengths. For one thing, I have already done this at length elsewhere; interested readers can consult that publication and there would be little justification for repeating its content here.¹⁵ Second, the editors of «Il mestiere di storico» have invited Professor Connelly to respond to these reviews, and it would be neither interesting for him nor useful for the readership of this journal if he had nothing to respond to but a litany of praise. What follows, therefore, will focus on some of the main questions and reservations that I have about this book. The gentle reader will keep in mind that these critiques are offered within a context of great admiration for Connelly's scholarly achievements here and elsewhere.

Connelly's reconstruction of the history of the movement to control world population raises crucial analytical questions of genealogy and agency, as well as ones on the moral and policy implications of his work for contemporary debates. I will take them up in order.

First, the book locates the origins of the movement to control world population in the racist concerns about migration and traces them through the high point of eugenics in the first half of the twentieth century directly to the postwar campaigns for family planning. This is a plausible lineage and, especially when presented with Connelly's narrative flair, a highly compelling one. But is it the only possible genealogical path that might have been traced for the idea of family planning? Connelly emphasizes the roots of the population control movement in supremacist discourses, whether of race, class, or gender. But he has less to say about the connections between postwar family planning programs and the broader high modernist, governmentalist sensibility that shaped public policy around the world – in the socialist and postcolonial worlds no less, and perhaps even more, than in the West – during the middle decades of the last century. Seeing the embeddedness of family planning campaigns with this *weltanschauung*—what James C. Scott called «seeing like a state» and Timothy Mitchell dubbed «rule of experts»¹⁶ – is arguably no less crucial to understanding their rise and fall than tracing their supremacist origin. Were not these campaigns, after all, central components of development programs

15. E. Manela, *Reconceiving International History*, in «Reviews in American History», 37 (2009), pp. 69-77.

16. J.C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998; T. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity*, Berkeley, California University Press, 2002.

that were widely viewed among postcolonial elites as markers of modernity, pillars of state legitimacy, and icons of nationalist pride?

A second and related set of questions touches on the issues of agency and culpability. At the outset of the book, Connelly tells us that his goal is to focus on population control projects that had global ambitions, rather than ones designed to shape the population of a single nation. And as the book traces the vicissitudes of family planning programs in various countries – India, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and others – the spotlight remains on the ways in which these programs intersected with international activists and organizations, originating primarily in the West, who dreamed of controlling population on a planetary scale. But as the book itself makes clear, these activists were always utterly dependent on the support and collaboration of officials in «target» countries, who were often even keener than the foreign experts, advisers, and donors to impose sweeping family planning programs among their own populace, seeing such programs as central components of nation-building projects designed to shape and control the newly constituted *body politic*. In fact, one could easily read the story of the proponents for global population control as one of constant frustration and repeated setbacks, except, that is, when their designs intersected the nation-building visions of postcolonial officials.

This insight leads to a rather uncomfortable reflection. Could Connelly's framing of his project, appealing and innovative as it is, have not only minimized the role of Third World actors in the story of postwar family planning but also obfuscated the centrality in that story of national projects and enclosures? If so, is this simply an inevitable and acceptable cost of a welcome historiographical shift toward «seeing beyond the state»? Or alternatively, is there a way to hold international, transnational, and national aspects of a historical narrative in perfect counterpoise, to see both the state and what is beyond it equally within a single historiographical gaze? Clearly, there is no easy answer, but this question is a central one in the quest for a new international history.

This thought-provoking book also raises important questions about the moral and policy implications of this history. Connelly takes up these issues explicitly in the book's introduction and conclusion, and the text's tone of moral indignation is such that one of the blurbs on the dust jacket describes the book as «angry». Our understanding of this sense of outrage, however, is complicated by Connelly's emphasis, in the introduction and conclusion of the book, on the need for empathy toward the family planners who, after all, saw themselves as struggling valiantly to prevent what they thought was a social and ecological calamity. It is not easy to say, moreover, whether Connelly thinks that population growth was never a problem at all – that the warnings about its dangers were simply bogus – or whether there was indeed a problem, though not one that justified policies that he sees as both immoral and inept. In other words, are there any terms or contexts in which rapid population growth could be a legitimate concern of activists and government officials, or are there none?

Finally, one wonders whether Connelly is expecting too much when he expresses the hope that the rejection of the excesses of past family planning campaigns will serve as a common ground for dialogue between the opposing sides in the fight over abortion that has raged in the United States in the past several decades. It is possible, after all, for both sides in this debate to reject coercive birth control and still come no closer to agreeing on whether the choice to have or to perform an abortion is an inalienable right or a capital crime. Still, one can hope. If *Fatal Misconception* does help us inch, however imperceptibly, toward resolution in this debate, its own conception will have been, well, positively immaculate.

Emily S. Rosenberg

Fatal Misconception presents a global history of the politics of population in the twentieth century. Specifically, it traces the rise of world-wide campaigns to plan population growth; it analyzes how population control «experts» came to exercise substantial power over «family planning» from the 1960s into the 1980s; and it charts the fragmentation of the population control movement as it faced internal divisions, problematic results, and external (especially religious-based) opposition. By the 1990s, strategies of women's empowerment (which had long held the only meaningful correlation to limitation of family size) triumphed over the top-down networks of eugenic engineers. But the earlier links between «family planning» and the often coercive eugenic programs that had accompanied imperialism and models of «development» remain a historical conjuncture that cannot simply be wished away.

The book raises provocative issues about the role of non-state transnational groups and their interface with state power. More importantly, it raises practical and moral questions about «humanitarian» interventions, especially as they might relate to reproduction. Connelly suggests that, for much of the twentieth century, experts in the thrall of top-down planning devised an array of methods to engineer the lives of others, sometimes to devastating effect.

For historians of international relations, demographic trends have often served as a kind of wallpaper – a background that is taken for granted rather than interrogated. Over the last decade, however, more and more historians have been calling for global histories that transcend the nation-state framework by focusing on transnational networks and global flows. Movements to shape populations – along with often related topics such as health and disease, consumerism, human-rights advocacy, environmental change, religion, and others – clearly seem to be as vital to understanding world history as are the more conventional topics of war and peace, of statecraft and diplomacy.

Connelly's most enduring contribution is to illustrate how the study of powerful transnational networks can recast the frameworks for twentieth century history. Although the population control movement became especially strong in the United States, advocates (and opponents) emerged from different locations in the world and formed a variety of non-governmental associations. The shifting relationships among these networks, various governmental programs, and international bodies such as the UN provide a complex view of world politics. Traditional landmarks such as World War II and the Cold War are not absent from the story, but their importance is refigured.

Rather than being cast as an exceptional case, for example, wartime Nazi efforts to purify the German population are placed within a longer, transnational history of eugenic control. In this history, U.S. experts loom as major players both before and after the war. Moreover, and contrary to many narratives, eugenic thinking did not die with the Nazi regime. Rather, it morphed in the postwar years into a discourse of development that, especially in the Third World, emphasized draconian demographic engineering. Major foundations, local developmental nationalists, the United Nations, the World Bank, and U.S. aid programs all embraced strategies to reduce birth rates through coercion as well as consent. The «developmental decade», named by President Kennedy in 1961, produced top-down strategies for reducing population growth in the «developing» world by controlling, in the name of humanitarianism, the most intimate decisions of life.

Just as World War II does not mark a decisive rupture, neither does the polarization in socio-economic systems associated with the Cold War. Population control held sway on all sides of the Cold War, which was in many ways a competition over developmental models. Both India and China illustrate how slower-working programs of education (especially education for women) gave way to all manner of coercions to limit family size, including payments and involuntary sterilization. The international movement built by Margaret Sanger and others in the early twentieth century had uneasily championed both the technologies of «birth control», which emphasized enlarging reproductive choice for women, and the programs for «population control», which pursued eugenic goals. In the can-do urgency of the «developmental decade», the top-down strategies won the day in capitalist and socialist countries alike. The men-in-a-hurry who assumed the lead in statistics-driven population policies had little time for women's concerns. Even when many of the population experts embraced the capacious term «family planning», which women's empowerment groups also advocated, the goal of quickly limiting population growth guided their funding programs. Meanwhile, communist China, having adapted its own population control strategies, found support within the transnational «family planning» networks. For «family planning» experts, who were in the Cold War years mostly male, limiting population meant controlling people's bodies – monitoring women's behavior and promoting sterilization technologies for both women and men. Cold War ideological differences could fade under the solidarities that bonded «scientific» male experts.

Connelly works against other familiar frames as well. He resists the simplistic narrative of population control being a conspiracy by white, wealthy elites and by Northern governments eager to keep down the global South. Rather, he effectively presents the population control movement as flowing in irregular and shifting networks. The United States was only one center of activism; contributions also came from leaders in Scandinavia, India, China, and elsewhere. Although at times the population control movement worked together, it had many strands and strains.

In the 1980s, Asian governments – China, India, Korea, and Singapore – all carried out their most intensive campaigns to limit and shape their populations. The growing identification of «planning» programs with the communist state of China, however, provided a new opening, during the Ronald Reagan administration in the United States, for Catholic and other «pro-life» groups to target «family planning» efforts as a part of their anti-abortion activism. The social and culture wars of late twentieth century America reshaped the population control policies that the U.S. had customarily championed in world forums, and the resurgent Republican party withdrew money from «family planning» initiatives. Women's groups who rallied to preserve reproductive rights against the onslaught from the Right in America resisted reminders of the links that «family planning» had once had to eugenic goals. «Collective amnesia descended over the field», writes Connelly (p. 359). Still, a historical legacy weighs on family planning organizations. Too often «family planning» is still read as «population control» in India and elsewhere.

New transnational feminist organizations that formed in the 1980s, mostly led within the global South, fought to maximize women's power in reproductive (and other) decisions. Changed by such women and their global networks, foundations, NGOs, and the UN increasingly understood «family planning» as less about population control than about reproductive rights, health, and women's education. In response, the Catholic Church in the 1990s launched a diplomatic offensive «unprecedented in Church history» to oppose «contraceptive imperialism» (p. 365). Muslim clerics also denounced «family planning» as an imperialist assault on Islam. The 1994 Cairo Conference's endorsement of «Gender Equality, Equity and Empowerment of Women», marked the final move away from «population control» and also a victory, at least in this one transnational forum, over objections by Catholic and Muslim patriarchal elements.

It is now clear that «the emancipation of women, not population control, remade humanity», concludes Connelly (p. 375). Yet Connelly also argues that the link between women's education and lower birth rates had always been clear. The old «race suicide» theories, for example, rested on the idea that economically secure and educated women would have fewer children than less educated and vulnerable ones. Not until women themselves began playing a decisive role in international forums, however, did promoting education and empowerment become standard policy.

Connelly manages to tie this complicated picture into a chronological narrative that provides a sense of drama and movement. Even as his discussion ranges across geographical space and organizational differences, the reader is anchored clearly in time. His engaging writing style often highlights the role of particular (sometimes colorful) individuals, while he nonetheless maintains his focus on larger structural and intellectual shifts. His research sources are extremely rich. An abundance of private papers, foundation archives, and governmental records help document a history that has hardly been sketched before, while a wealth of secondary work situates this research in a broad global context.

Works of history that I most admire are so compelling that they force a reader into an imagined dialogue with the author. In this sense, it is a compliment to say that Connelly's book has drawn me into silent conversations about the politics of population, about larger issues of top-down social interventions, and about the craft of history-writing. For me, the didactic frame that Connelly imposes on his otherwise impressive history has raised my most substantial questions.

Connelly draws a clear lesson that he inscribes in the title: «The great tragedy of population control, the fatal misconception, was to think that one could know other people's interests better than they knew it themselves» (p. 378). He warns that this lesson applies to not just the past but the future.

I need little convincing that imperial knowledge asserted by managers and experts can wreak disaster in the name of improvement. James Scott's landmark *Seeing Like a State*¹⁷ presents a powerful critique of such modernist, universalistic schemes. Like Connelly, I worry that ideas about planning other people's lives remain very much alive in the biopolitics involved in whatever is the crisis *d'jour* – global pandemic, natural disaster, counterterrorism, or fill-in-the-blank. Indeed, the many new genetic and surveillance technologies of the past decade raise a truly alarming specter that innovations in population control and eugenic engineering may masquerade as security and lifestyle improvement.

Yet I have a bias against using history to draw crystal-clear lessons. Historical meanings seem multiple, contingent, and unstable. Consider, for a moment, an alternative historical narrative about expertise.

Ideas about the benefits of top-down planning and social engineering emerged within a specific historical context around the turn of the last century. As Daniel Rodgers¹⁸ and others have suggested, the problems raised by industrial capitalism and the associated global migration of workers sparked transnational conversations that were infused by faith in science and managerial expertise. What U.S. historians have often called the «organiza-

17. J.C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998.

18. D.T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings. Social politics in a progressive age*, Cambridge (MA), Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998.

tional revolution» of the so-called «progressive era» was a global, if also highly differentiated, phenomenon. Germany in the 1880s pioneered a heavy state role in providing social insurance; many French reformers sought to wed the power of the state to labor-driven cooperatives of various kinds; American Progressives accepted a stronger dose of corporate input into the delivery of social goods but tried to devise public-sector regulatory regimes; the new Soviet state turned toward centralized planning on a massive scale. In all of these cases, the idea was widely shared that large-scale capital interests should not, by themselves, control the commanding heights of socio-economic organization and that policies instituted by national states and international networks could be effective counterweights to highly manipulative concentrations of economic power. Moreover, many of these transnational social policy experts understood that systems of power did not just center on corporate capitalism. Systems of patriarchy (especially if wedded to corporate power) seemed almost everywhere to deprive women of opportunities; localized tyrannies (not just in colonialism) enforced racial segregation; local land and mining barons often promoted overuse of common resources. Connelly correctly implies that transnational experts, who invoked empirical science to forge top-down plans, often reenforced the inequalities of empire, race, and gender. But their doctrines of expertise *also* emerged within feminist, anti-racist, and environmentalist critiques of these same inequalities.

As managers and bureaucracies reshaped governance in the early twentieth century, the contradictions between democracy and expertise became increasingly apparent. Would experts work on behalf of some vague «public interest», and who would define that term? Moreover, the corporate capture of organizations that were supposed to be watchdogs raised the problem of who would watch the watchdogs. Reappraisals of the culture of expertise developed in the United States on both the anti-New Deal Right (as expressed in, for example, *The Managerial Revolution* by Trotskyite-turned-neoconservative James Burnham¹⁹) and within the communitarian ideas of the global new left of the 1960s. Distrust of big government, of science, and of the transnational elites represented in foundations and the United Nations became staples of populist rhetoric on both left and right. Many corporations, especially in the United States, successfully deployed these themes in campaigns to preserve «freedom» against regulation, scientific «bureaucrats», and elite internationalism.

This all-too-compressed history of top-down expertise raises the question: to whom should Connelly's critique of those who seek to run other people's lives be directed? Clearly, it depends on one's perspective. Connelly seems to imply in the closing sentence that the struggle against fatal misconceptions must be carried on by those who are «animated by a vision of social justice» (p. 384). But the eugenicists of a century ago would,

19. J. Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: what is happening in the world*, New York, The John Day Company, 1941.

of course, have placed themselves squarely in such a camp. Moreover, in his rendering, once transnational experts embraced the goal of women's empowerment, their networks became benign. But cannot women (a pretty broad category) also sometimes be experts who seek ways to enforce their views on others? And do not the Catholic Church and Muslim clerics also claim to have visions of just and well-ordered societies? And why does his book give no consideration to corporate power – those pharmaceutical companies and medical device firms who have made fortunes from various reproductive technologies and the many others which have funded huge campaigns to discredit science and expertise as elitist and coercive? Which companies may be participants in «fatal misconceptions», and which would Connelly align with his agenda of non-coercive social policies? (In this book, the invisible hand is truly invisible, and a little Gramsci might have been in order.) In a suburb nearby where I live, the ultra-right wing «taxpayer's league» has erected a large bulletin board that reads «Stop Social Engineering». They, too, oppose people who run other people's lives. They, too, favor social justice, and their version is defined in terms of low taxes, no regional urban planning, no racially integrated federal housing projects, and fewer regulations, especially on guns. Establishing education for women in societies that are hostile to it may involve running other people's lives; so may fighting racism and mitigating class inequalities. The more one digs into the morass of the lesson within which Connelly has framed his study, the more its applicability slides away. In my view, Connelly's book illustrates the strengths of a narrative that presents the complex and interwoven strands of historical conjuncture; but it also shows the limitations of stifling history's multivocality by flattening its rich context into universalized lessons.

Connelly's turn to the didactic is (for me, at least) misconceived but not fatal. He has written a splendid transnational history that presents a complex story in graceful, even dramatic, prose. Despite – or with the help of – my interior dialogue about who has misconceived what and why, the book has recast some of the ways in which I understand the twentieth century. It is a work of major historical importance.

Matthew J. Connelly

I am deeply grateful for this opportunity to engage with such distinguished critics – all the more since we are discussing international history for an international readership. Emily Rosenberg writes that she had already imagined we were in dialogue even before we were invited to participate in this forum. But the dialogue was not altogether imagined. I wrote this book with the hope that these very same historians would recognize my attempt to join with them in creating new ways to narrate contemporary history. It is gratifying to be able to debate the relative merits of different approaches, with the idea that

others may be persuaded to follow one or another. It is even more exciting to realize that, in these still expanding fields of international, transnational, and global history, younger scholars will be inspired to devise new methods and narrative strategies we cannot even begin to imagine. It is an honor to think that, through this forum, I might be in dialogue with them as well.

My colleagues have paid me the respect of offering probing critiques, and I will respond with the same honesty – even at the risk of seeming ungrateful for their encouragement. I readily admit my approach is not appropriate for every problem in the history of world politics. As much as I emphasize the importance of international and nongovernmental organizations for this particular subject, I do not believe it represents the withering of state power. Instead, we are witnessing the pluralization of world politics, and in some ways – including population control – the rise of «non-state actors» has made states stronger. So whether we give more attention to the international, transnational, or national aspects, to answer Erez Manela's question, must depend on the history we seek to explain.

Even in the domain of population politics, my book necessarily left out much that remains enigmatic and fascinating. It did not focus on the sometimes subtle but always significant differences in how population control played out in different places. But this is not a neglected subject, as Mark Bradley's references clearly indicate. And for all the differences among newly-independent states and their nation-building projects – which Erez Manela thinks should have loomed larger in my account – there remains a striking similarity, and simultaneity, in population control campaigns all over the world. Why did dozens of different countries decide within two decades that they had to reduce the fertility of their own people? Why did they adopt the same tactics and technologies? And why did so many finally abandon manipulative and coercive methods?

These questions required an historical ethnography, but not of a single locale. Instead, I chose to examine a transnational network of scientists, activists, and aid workers, but only after considering alternatives. My first publication on the subject, a review essay, suggested several different strategies to investigate this history. I was particularly intrigued by the possibility of connecting macro-level analysis with the micro-history of reproduction.²⁰ Contrary to Giovanni Gozzini, I believe that anthropologists have demolished the notion that there was a single demographic transition – something even demographers no longer believe – and that all the world is converging around the same reproductive norm (it is not, for instance, consistently correlated with infant mortality).²¹ Whatever the in-

20. *Population Control is History: New Perspectives on the International Campaign to Limit Population Growth*, in «Comparative Studies in Society and History», 45 (2003), pp. 122-147.

21. *The Decline of Fertility in Europe*, ed. by A.J. Coale and S. Watkins, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986.

tentions of population controllers, the birth control clinic could be a site of negotiation and exchange. This is what alerted me at the outset that population control campaigns might not, in the end, have actually succeeded in controlling populations.

This is indeed a story of frustration and failure, as Giovanni Gozzini and Erez Mane-la write. But it was not a failure without consequence. Finding the problem of changing reproductive behavior complex beyond their imagining, population controllers tried to impose conformity. Meeting resistance, they turned to more manipulative and coercive methods. And before this movement finally «evolved» to accept the indivisibility of reproductive rights and health, it had already provoked a powerful backlash that continues to endanger these ideals all over the world.

This kind of narrative cannot explain how every individual in every community made different choices and experienced different outcomes – in some cases quite the opposite of what population controllers intended. But it can help explain why, for the first time in history, hundreds of millions of people were facing these kinds of choices, and how large numbers were sometimes convinced or coerced to do the same thing. So, however probing and perceptive, a local study of one Southern Chinese village cannot account for why the number of sterilizations, abortions, and IUD insertions across China rose and fell in unison. That required a different level of analysis, and neglecting it would miss the forest for the trees.

Mark Bradley laments that my approach seems uninformed by theoretical work on gender and sexuality – indeed, that I seem disinterested in engaging with it. In other writings addressed directly to an academic audience, I have been more explicit in outlining my concerns about biopolitics and the particular theoretical approaches that have been most helpful.²² I think my disagreement with Bradley really comes down to how we think historians can most productively engage with theory, and my own concern with how it too often leads us to disengage from the broader public. I am indeed impatient with work that purports to be theoretical but is actually «performative» – not in the sense that Judith Butler intends, but rather because practitioners like Butler are staging performances for one another long after the audience has left the building.²³

As an historian, I am convinced that the best way we can engage with theory is not to write about theorists, but to test their claims. Theory is useless if it does not help explain what is otherwise inexplicable. The acknowledgment of Michel Foucault in the conclusion was therefore not cursory, but the highest compliment. I was crediting him with having developed the concept that explains much of the history narrated over the

22. M.J. Connelly, *Seeing Beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty*, in «Past & Present», 193 (2006), pp. 197-233.

23. M.C. Nussbaum, *The Professor of Parody – the Hip Defeatism of Judith Butler*, in «New Republic», 22 (February 22, 1999), pp. 37-45.

preceding 400 pages, i.e. how and why networks of scientists and activists challenged state sovereignty and changed the way people govern themselves.

That is not to say that historians cannot also contribute to parsimonious and even elegant ways of explaining the world. For instance, I remain intrigued by the possibility of connecting macro and micro levels of analysis. But it did not seem possible to accomplish such a study on the scale required, or to relate what I discovered in the form of a narrative. A narrative seemed crucial to show how this history might have happened differently. To answer Erez Manela's question, there were many paths that led to family planning – including eugenics, but also statistics, public health, and feminism – and it could have led in different directions. Were it not for World War II and the Cold War, those who insisted that it include sex education and gender equality would have been in a stronger position to resist more coercive agendas.

A narrative also revealed the potential – as well as the limits – for particular individuals to challenge such agendas. I agree with Erez Manela and with Emily Rosenberg that population control can be understood in the context of other modernizing projects that were meant to improve other people, some of them ongoing. Rosenberg is quite right that they have been animated by the authority of experts, and have also forged transnational networks in pursuit of global goals. I can well understand her worry that, in trying to make sense of all this, and suggest that there is a larger lesson, I imply that the implications should be crystal clear. In fact, the «fatal misconception» of the title is a very human failing, and helping other people without robbing them of their agency is a perennial challenge. The problem is particularly acute when people try to work across borders, as they must in a world in which so many problems cannot be contained or even understood within the framework of a single state.

Expertise and networks – even compulsion, when it comes to requiring that children go to school – are not inherently good or evil. That is precisely why we need to create institutions, including transnational institutions, that can make them accountable. I have obviously not solved the problem of global governance, but neither did I suggest that it was as simple as ensuring that activists share a vision of social justice, and that any vision would do. This closing line referred to the cause of reproductive freedom, which – to survive – requires a commitment to human equality. That commitment must be redefined and renewed in every era.

Finally, I have often cautioned my students that the duty of the historian is not to judge, but to explain. But it can be easier to preach empathy than to practice it. The subject of population control posed a special challenge, since the belief that one can know someone else's interests better than they know it themselves is the opposite of empathy. If stating this plainly strikes at least some readers as condemnation, perhaps it cannot be helped. Perhaps we have made some progress after all.